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provided by family members or for the labor expense of meals eaten
out.

Neither question was really at issue before Judge Rigtrup

because those items had in fact been paid by Phoenix, up to the
twenty dollar per day statutory limit.

Phoenix also indicated the

numerous disputed issues of material fact surrounding the payment
of the specific items sought by plaintiff in this case.

Since the

court below found that the statute did not require payments in
excess of twenty dollars per day, it did not even reach any issues
concerning these questions, and accordingly they are moot and
should not be addressed on appeal.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This case turns on the interpretation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-22-307(l)(b)(ii) (1986), which reads as follows:
Personal injury protection coverages and benefits
include:
(b)(ii) a special damage allowance not
exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 days,
for services actually rendered or expenses
reasonably incurred for services that, but for
the injury, the injured person would have
performed for his household, except that this
benefit need not be paid for the first three days
after the date of injury unless the person's
inability to perform these services continues for
more than two consecutive weeks . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts set out by plaintiff were admitted by Phoenix
for purposes of the summary judgment motion below.
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R. 41.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The statute's literal terms provide for a daily limit on
the amount of special damage allowance which is payable.
Plaintiff's interpretation would require the Court to gloss over
the plain meaning of the statute and impose a convoluted reading
which violates the rules of statutory construction.
Plaintiff's interpretation would also not serve the
legislative intent to reduce costs, effectuate savings and provide
prompt payments.

It would instead open up insurance carriers to

an indefinite amount of liability and encourage them to scrutinize
claims which are currently paid up to the statutory limit, without
dispute.
The one case plaintiff presents in support of her
position involves a New Jersey statute which, unlike Utah, does
not provide for payment for gratuitous services.

The Utah statute

reflects a balancing of the wish to pay for gratuitous services
rendered while avoiding unnecessary administrative expense and
limiting the insurance carrier's exposure to excessive or
fraudulent claims.

The daily statutory limitation permits a

reasonable amount of gratuitous services to be compensated for
while permitting the carrier (and therefore the public who pays
the premiums) to avoid excessive costs from exorbitant claims or
the investigation of such claims.

The $20 daily limit is the

legislative answer to these competing interests.

This Court

should respect that determination by giving effect to the statute
as written and affirm the District Court's order.

-3-

ARGUMENT
Plaintiff requests this Court to endorse a strained
interpretation of Utah's No-Fault Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-22-307(l)(b)(ii) (1986) which would grant her a few
additional dollars, impose a large administrative and financial
burden on insurance companies paying benefits under the Act, and
frustrate the Legislature's intentions to reduce costs, effectuate
savings, and promote prompt payment on claims.
Utah's No-Fault Act provides personal injury protection
to covered individuals ("PIP benefits").

Those PIP benefits

include medical expenses, up to $3,000 per person; lost wage
benefits up to $250 per week for up to 52 weeks; and a special
damage allowance "not exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365
days, for services actually rendered or expenses actually incurred
for services . . . "

It is this last element, the special damages

allowance, which concerns us in this case.

Plaintiff claims that

the quoted language should be read to provide an aggregate total
to permit her to receive $20 for each day of incapacity, up to the
total amount claimed for services which Plaintiff would have
performed for her household but for her injury, regardless of when
the services were rendered or expenses incurred, rather than
receiving the allowance for services actually rendered or expenses
actually incurred up to a daily limit of $20.00.
It should be noted that the other issues mentioned by
plaintiff, whether the allowance may be recovered for services
provided by family members or for the labor portion of the expense
-4-

for meals eaten at a restaurant, are moot and not properly on
appeal.

It is undisputed that Phoenix has paid for such benefits

to the extent they have been claimed, up to the statutory limit of
$20 per day.

Accordingly, these questions are not in dispute,

were not considered by the trial judge in granting Phoenix's
motion for summary judgment, and should not be considered on
appeal.

It is also clear that payment of any additional amounts

would be subject to the limitation of reasonableness imposed by
the statute, and would require the determination of disputed
material facts to resolve.

THE STATUTE IS CLEAR AND REQUIRES A DAILY LIMIT ON AMOUNTS PAYABLE.
The issue before the Court is whether the No-Fault Act
mandates payments in excess of the services actually rendered or
expenses actually incurred on a given day.

The statute requires

an allowance "not exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 days
• . ." While there is no Utah authority directly on point, the
plain language of the statute, the legislative proposal it serves,
and Utah case law interpreting its predecessor, all compel the
conclusion drawn by the court below—that no such additional
payments are required.
A. The Rules of Statutory Construction Require That
Meaning Be Given To All Terms of the Statute.
To argue that the Utah statute establishes only an
aggregate upper limit rather than a daily allowance for amounts

-5-

incurred that day, up to twenty dollars, offends the plain meaning
of the section.

Plaintiffs interpretation strips the term "not

exceeding $20 per day" of all meaning, other than as a measuring
stick of the amount recoverable, i.e., $20 x the number of days of
disability.

As this Court recently stated:

The basic rule for statutory construction is
that words used in statutes should be given their
ordinary, plain meaning: 'the presumption is that
the words are used in their ordinary sense, and
if a different interpretation is sought it must
rest upon something in the character of the
legislation or in the context which will justify
a different meaning.
In the Matter of Adoption of M.L.T., 746 P.2d 1179 at 1180 (Utah
App. 1987), quoting Deseret Savings Bank v. Francis, 62 Utah 85,
217 P. 1114, 1115 (1923).

The Court should also give effect to

the Legislature's underlying intent, assume that each term in a
statute was used advisedly, and interpret the statute in
accordance with its literal wording unless it is unreasonably
confusing or inoperable.

Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western

Railroad, 749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App. 1988).
Here the statutory language provides for:
. . . a special damage allowance not exceeding
$20 per day for a maximum of 365 days, for
services actually rendered or expenses reasonably
incurred for services that, but for the injury,
the injured person would have performed for his
household . . .
§ 31A-22-307(l)(b)(ii). The literal reading of this section is
that a $20 per day limit is placed on services actually rendered
or reasonably incurred that day.

By contrast, plaintiff wishes

the Court to ignore the statutory language and instead act as if
-6-

it read "a special damage allowance not to exceed a total of $20
dollars times the number of days of disability, up to 365 days."
If that had been intended, it would have been drafted that way by
the Legislature.
The literal reading of the statute is in harmony with the
legislative intent shown when the No-Fault Act was originally
enacted to "stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings in the
rising costs of automobile accident insurance,"

Jamison v. Utah

Home Fire Insurance Company, 559 P.2d 958, 960 (Utah, 1977)
(emphasis by the Court), citing Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-2.

To

permit recovery beyond that provided by the strict wording of the
statute would contravene the legislative intent.

The statute is

to be construed to promote justice, and to carry out the purpose
of the Insurance Code that "policyholders, claimants, and insurers
are treated fairly and equitably; . . . "
§ 31A-1-102(2) (1985).

Utah Code Ann.

As discussed below, the Utah statute

balances the wish to pay claims for certain "primary damages as to
necessary medical, hospital, and loss of wages . . . without undue
delay." Jamison, supra, 559 P.2d at 959, with the "stated
objective" to effectuate savings. Id at 960.

Plaintiffs

interpretation fails to give the words of the statute their full
meaning, and would also throw off this legislatively crafted
balance.

-7-

B.

Utah Case Law Rejects Interpretations Which Gloss

Over The Statutory Language.
In Jamison, supra, the Utah Supreme Court discussed
§ 31-41-6(l)(b)(ii), the predecessor to § 31A-22-307(l)(b)(ii).
That section provided in pertinent part:
• . . in lieu of reimbursement for expenses which
would have been reasonably incurred for services
. . . regardless of whether any of these expenses
were actually incurred, an allowance of $12.00
per day . . . continuing for a maximum of 365
days thereafter . . .
The plaintiff in Jamison sought an "automatic award of $12 per day
for injury to any member of a household who would have performed
services of any nature, however much or minimal, and whether their
value is great or small."

559 P.2d at 959.

The Court rejected

such an approach, applying instead a "rule of reason" in
determining what amounts could be recovered in any given case,
stating:
The principle which best serves the
objective to be desired is to give both parties
the benefit of a sensible, even-handed and
practical application of the statute, under the
assumption that all of its language was used
advisedly and in harmony with its purposes. If
the Act had intended reimbursement for any and
all duties performed by members of households, it
could have plainly so stated. But it does not do
so. Only by keeping the awards within reason,
and excepting therefrom claims that might be
unrealistic, fanciful, or perhaps even
fraudulent, can the stated objective, 'to
effectuate . . . savings in the rising costs of
automobile accident insurance . . .'be
accomplished. Otherwise it is obvious that
necessary increases in premiums would defeat,
rather than promote, the purposes of the Act.
559 P.2d at 960 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).
-8-

Similarly, if the Legislature intended to only provide a
cap on recovery rather than a daily limit, it could have easily
done so.

Just as the attempt was rejected in Jamison to recover

the allowance without regard to the statutory requirement that the
expenses "would have been reasonably incurred," so should
plaintiff's attempt here be rejected to recover without regard to
the statutory limitation of $20 per day.
Section 31A-22-307(l)(b)(ii) differs from § 31-416(l)(b)(ii) by raising the daily limit to $20 and attempting to
spell out the Jamison court's holding that recovery could be
either expenses reasonably incurred or services actually
rendered.

That amendment and renumbering, however, does nothing

to undermine the force of the Jamison court's determination that
automatic payments are not permitted.

Plaintiff here seeks to

recover payments automatically, without regard to the daily
limitation provided in that statute.
C. Plaintiff's Interpretation Raises Problems Of
Interpretation and Administration.
Plaintiff's aggregate limit interpretation either permits
plaintiff to recover up to 20 x 365, without regard to the length
of disability, an interpretation clearly at odds with the intent
to effectuate savings the Supreme Court relied so heavily upon in
Jamison; or to obtain up to $20 x the number of days of
disability.

This latter version raises serious problems of

implementation and interpretation.

-9-

To eliminate the statutory

daily limit would cast carriers adrift with no practicable way to
determine how much to pay.

Presumably, plaintiff's argument is

that Phoenix should pay more than twenty dollars on some days on
the hope that it will be able to offset that overpayment against
other days when reimbursement for less than $20 is claimed.
However, this non-textual interpretation provides no guidance in
determining how far off of a twenty dollar per day average the
carrier should get in making payments.
Plaintiffs situation demonstrates a few of the problems
with her approach.

Referring to her household services worksheet,

Exhibit A to plaintiffs Brief, R. 23-25, plaintiff was injured on
June 16, 1988.

In the next fourteen days, June 17-June 30,

plaintiff claims reimbursement for $640.50, when even recovering
$20 for every day would only yield $280 (and plaintiff was paid
$270).

How much of the excess money should Phoenix have

advanced?

Reviewing amounts claimed for the next month shows that

there was little opportunity to set off any additional amounts
paid.

During July, plaintiff claimed $800.50, while recovery of

$20 each day would only yield $620.

How many days, weeks, or

months would a carrier have to overpay before it could begin to
pay less than $20 on a day when $20 or more was claimed in order
to avoid overpaying?

The problem becomes impossible when one

considers that the duration of a claimant's disability is variable
and impossible to ascertain in advance. A carrier could advance
payments and then never have a chance to offset if the claimant
recovers sooner than expected.

If the carrier were to delay
-10-

payment until the end of disability to avoid this problem, it
would frustrate the Act's clear intention to provide payment
"without undue delay." Jamison, 559 P.2d at 959.

Following the

language of the statute and limiting payment to expenses incurred
or services rendered in a given day, up to $20, avoids these
problems and permits a fast, definitive determination of the
claimant's entitlement, effectuating the statutory purpose of
treating the claimants and insurers fairly and equitably.
The statutory daily limit serves also another purpose—it
avoids many disputes regarding the reasonableness of claimed
expenses or services. As the Jamison decision makes clear, the
determination of the compensability of each claim is an issue of
fact turning upon the circumstances of the claim.

Where a carrier

can, as Phoenix did here, attempt to avoid the expense and delay
of disputing certain items by paying the daily maximum of $20, the
statute's purpose of treating the parties fairly and avoiding
delay is served.

Under plaintiff's interpretation, however, the

carrier must scrutinize every claim to avoid having to pay it
through some as yet undeveloped procedure to offset against
hoped-for future underpayments.
Reference to plaintiff's circumstances illustrates this
point.

It is clear under Jamison that payment is only required

for work actually done, which the plaintiff would have done but
for the injury, and for which it is reasonable to incur expenses,
regardless of whether or not expenses were actually incurred.
P.2d at 960-961.

559

In the period June 26 through June 30, plaintiff
-11-

claims that 59.1 hours of services were rendered, as well as
additional restaurant expense, for a total of $301,50. Rather
than having to investigate each item exhaustively to avoid payment
on inflated claims, Phoenix was able to avoid unnecessary costs
and delay by permitting recovery of $20 each day.
D. Plaintiff's Only Case In Support Of Her Position Is
Not On Point.
Plaintiff bases her argument on one case from New Jersey,
Gulla v. Allstate Insurance Co., 180 N.J. Super 413, 434 A.2d 1158
(N.J. 1981), which has not since been cited in other decisions.
Plaintiff argues that the Utah statute should be interpreted to
provide an "aggregate limit," which would permit her to recover
$20.00 per day even for days in which no service was rendered or
expense was incurred.
In Gulla, the statute provided for recovery of "necessary
and reasonable expenses incurred for such substitute essential
services" subject to a limit of $12 per day and $4380 over the
course of the injured person's life.

N.J.S.A. § 39:6A-4(c).

By

contrast, Utah's statute permits recovery for both expenses
actually incurred and other services actually rendered, "not
exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 days."
§ 31A-22-307(l)(b)(ii).

Utah Code Ann.

Under the New Jersey approach, necessary

and reasonable expenses may be reimbursed to permit:
. . . a recovery of either $12 a day for each day
of the disability, whether or not payment for

-12-

services was made on a daily basis, or $4380.00,
whichever is less,
434 A.2d at 1160 (emphasis in original).
There is an important difference between the New Jersey
statute interpreted in Gulla and Utah's statute.

The New Jersey

statute only refers to reimbursement of expenses incurred, with no
provision for payment for services gratuitously provided, as
Utah's statute permits.

That broader remedial purpose in Utah's

statute requires strict adherence to the statutory language.
Unlike expenses, which are relatively easy to verify, the extent
of services rendered for which no payment was made is inherently
difficult to substantiate.

The Utah Legislature chose to require

payment for gratuitous services rendered, but it also imposed an
upper limit on the amount allowed each day.

To eliminate the

protection afforded by the statutory daily limit would upset the
balance established by the Legislature, and encourage carriers to
spend additional time and money investigating special damage
allowance claims to avoid incurring unnecessary expense, which
would effectively delay the payment of and increase the cost of
PIP benefits for everyone.
As the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
. . . insurance is a business, not a
philanthropy. There can be no free gifts or
benefactions. In the long run premiums must pay
for losses; and therefore, increases in premiums
must and will be correlated to the extent of the
coverage. . . . Accordingly, a seeming generosity
in broadening coverage in an individual
situation, would be no favor to policyholders
generally, nor to the public.
Jamison, supra, 559 P.2d at 960.
-13-

Plaintiff's interpretation is cumbersome, leads to
uncertainty, delay, and increased expense and cost.

By contrast,

the decision of the court below gives meaning to all of the
statute, effectuates the stated purposes of the No-Fault Act, and
provides a simple, fast, and definite method to pay the PIP
special damages allowance.

Utah courts have not adopted the

"aggregate limit" view in conjunction with Title 31A, and have
rejected automatic payments under its predecessor statute.

There

is no Utah authority to permit payments in excess of the amounts
actually incurred in a given day and they should not be
permitted.

The District Court's rejection of plaintiff's attempt

to reach beyond the statutory language was correct and should be
affirmed.

CONCLUSION
In interpreting the No-Fault Act, the Court must give
effect to the plain language of the statute, and seek to act
consistently with the stated legislative intent. A "liberal"
interpretation of the statute does not always compel broader
coverage, especially where, as here, such an interpretation would
increase costs contrary to the original legislative intent, and
lead to delays, uncertainty, and confusion.

Plaintiff's

interpretation provides no method to cut off the carrier's
liability short of the 365 day limit, would engender unnecessary
disputes between claimants and insurers, and would upset the

-14-

legislative plan which provides for limited payment of
gratuitously rendered services.

The District Court's ruling

avoids these problems, permits the payment of the definite sums
provided for by the statute, and should be affirmed.
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A D D E N D U M

New Jersey S t a t u t e s Annotated
39:6A-3

MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC
Historical Note

The amendment by L.1972, c. 203,
deleted a requirement in the last
paragraph that the consent of the
commissioner of insurance be obtamed by licensed insurance carriers

before they cancel any required coverage.
E f f e c t i v e d a t e o f L . 1 9 7 2 , c . 70, see
H i s t o r i c a l N o t e u n d e r § gg-g^j.

Cross References
Compulsory motor vehicle insurance, see §§ 39:6B-1, 39:6B-2.
Library References

Automobiles <§=>43.

C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 110.

39:6A-4.

Personal injury protection coverage, regardless of
fault
Every automobile liability insurance policy insuring an automobile as defined in this act against loss resulting from liability
imposed by law for bodily injury, death and property damage
sustained by any person arising out of ownership, operation,
maintenance or use of an automobile shall provide additional
coverage, as defined herein below, under provisions approved by
the Commissioner of Insurance, for the payment of benefits
without regard to negligence, liability or fault of any kind, to
the named insured and members of his family residing in his
household who sustained bodily injury as a result of an accident
involving an automobile, to other persons sustaining bodily injury while occupying the automobile of the named insured or while
using such automobile with the permission of the named insured
and to pedestrians, sustaining bodily injury caused by the named
insured's automobile or struck by an object propelled by or from
such automobile. "Additional coverage" means and includes:
a. Medical expense benefits. Payment of all reasonable medical expenses incurred as a result of personal injury sustained in
an automobile accident. In the event of death, payment shall be
made to the estate of the decedent.
b. Income continuation benefits. The payment of the loss of
income of an income producer as a result of bodily injury disability, subject to a maximum weekly payment of $100.00, per
week. Such sums shall be payable during the life of the injured
person and shall be subject to an amount or limit of $5,200.00,
on account of injury to any one person, in any one accident.

204

NO FAULT INSURANCE

39:6A~4

c. Essential services benefits. Payment of essential services
benefits to an injured person shall be made in reimbursement of
necessary and reasonable expenses incurred for such substitute
essential services ordinarily performed by the injured person for
himself, his family and members of the family residing in the
household, subject to an amount or limit of $12.00 per day.
Such benefits shall be payable during the life of the injured person and shall be subject to an amount or limit of $4,380.00, on
account of injury to any one person in any one accident.
d. Survivor benefits. In the event of the death of an income
producer as a result of injuries sustained in an accident entitling
such person to benefits under section 4 of this act,1 the maximum amount of benefits which could have been paid to the income producer, but for his death, under section 4 b. shall be paid
to the surviving spouse, or in the event there is no surviving
spouse, then to the surviving children, and in the event there are
no surviving spouse or surviving children, then to the estate of
the income producer.
In the event of the death of one performing essential services
as a result of injuries sustained in an accident entitling such
person to benefits under section 4 c. of this act, the maximum
amount of benefits which could have been paid such person, under section 4 c , shall be paid to the person incurring the expense
of providing such essential services.
e. Funeral expenses benefits. All reasonable funeral, burial
and cremation expenses, subject to a maximum benefit of
$1,000.00, on account of the death to any one person in any one
accident shall be payable to decedent's estate.
L.1972, c. 70, § 4. Amended by L.1972, c. 203, § 3, eff Dec 26, 1972
i This section
Historical Note
As originally added by L1972, c
70, the definition of " s u n n o r benefits" read as follow s
"d
Survivor benefits
In the
event of the death of an income pro
ducer or one performing essential
services as a result of injuries sus
tamed in an automobile accident, the
benefits that would ha\e l>een paid
to the injured person but for his
death under section 4a, b, and c,
shall be paid to the surviving spouse

dependent upon the deceased for such
income or essential serwees, or in
the event there is no dependent surviving spouse, then to the surviving
children dependent upon the deceased
for such income or essential services "
The amendment b\ L1972, c 203,
allowed foi payment of benefits to
persons injuied as a result "of an accident involving an automobile" rath-
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elude: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, N e v a d a , New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico
and South Carolina.
Croqq Reference
oross-Keterence.
Safety Responsibility Act, 14-12-1 ct
seq.

Law Reviews.
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah
j j . Rev. 248.
Compensation Systems and Utah's NoF a u l t S t a t u t e , 1973 U t a h L. Rev. 383.
Countrywide Overview of Automobile
No-Fault Insurance, 23 Defense L. J. 443
(1974).

31-41-2. Purpose of act—Property damage claims not affected.—The
purpose of this act is to require the payment of certain prescribed benefits
in respect to motor vehicle accidents through either insurance or other
approved security but on the basis of no fault, preserving, however, the
right of an injured person to pursue the customary tort claims where the
most serious types of injuries occur. The intention of the legislature is
hereby to possibly stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings in, the rising
costs of automobile accident insurance and to effectuate a more efficient,
equitable method of handling the greater bulk of the ersonal injury
claims that arise out of automobile accidents, these being those not involving great amounts of damages. This act is not designed to have any effect
on property damage claims.
H i s t o r y : L. 1973, ch. 55, § 2.
Collateral References.
Insurance<§^>4.1.
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64.

See Am. J u r . 2d, N o - F a u l t
SS 1-34, when published.

Insurance

Validity and construction of "no-fault"
automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. R. 3d
229.

31-41-3. Definition of terms.—As used in this act:
0 ) "Motor vehicle" means any vehicle of a kind required to be
registered under Title 41. but excluding, however motorcycles.
(2) "Person" includes every natural person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, or any governmental entity, or agency of it.
(3) "Owner" means a person who holds the legal title to a motor
vehicle, or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of a security agreement or lease with option to purchase with the debtor or lessee having the
right to possession, then the debtor or lessee shall be deemed the owner for
purposes of this act.
(4) "Insured" means the named insured, the spouse or other relative
of the named insured who reside in the same household as the named insured, including those who usually make their home in the same household
but temporarily live elsewhere, or any person using the described motor
vehicle with the permission, either expressed or implied, of the owner.
(5) "Occupying" means being in or upon a motor vehicle as a passenger or operator or engaged in the immediate acts of entering, boarding,
or alighting from a motor vehicle.
(6) "Pedestrian" means any natural person not occupying or riding
upon a motor vehicle.
(7) "Department" means the Utah insurance department.
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 3.
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31-41-6. Minimum benefits — Determination of reasonable value of
medical expenses—Medical expenses include nonmedical remedial care and
treatment in accordance with religious method—Deductible amounts allowed.—(1) Every insurance policy or other security complying with the
requirements of subsection (1) of section 31-41-5 shall provide personal
injury protection providing for payments to the insured and to all other
persons suffering personal injury arising out of an accident involving any
motor vehicle, except as otherwise provided in this act, in at least the
following minimum amounts:
(a) Medical benefits: the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary
medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, and rehabilitation services, including
prosthetic devices, necessary ambulance, hospital, and nursing services
not to exceed a total of $2,000 per person, as determined under subsection
(2) of this section.
(b) Disability benefits- (i) 85% of any loss of gross income and loss
of earning capacity per person from inability to work during a period
commencing not later than three days after the date of the injury and continuing for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks thereafter, not to exceed a
total of $150 per week, but if the person's inability to work shall so continue for in excess of a total of two consecutive weeks after the date of
the injury, this three-day elimination period shall not be applicable; and
(ii) in lieu of reimbursement for expenses which would have been reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the injured person
would have performed for his household and regardless of whether any
of these expenses are actually incurred, an allowance of $12 per day
commencing not later than three days after the date of the injury and
continuing for a maximum of 365 days thereafter, but if the person's inability to perform these services shall so continue for in excess of a total
of fourteen days after the date of the injury, this three-day elimination
period shall not be applicable.
(c) Funeral benefits: funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to
exceed a total of $1,000 per person.
(d) Survivor benefits- compensation on account of death of a person,
payable to his heirs, in the total of $2,000.
(2) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided for in subsection (1) of this section and in subsection (1) (e) of
section 31-41-9, the department shall conduct a relative value study of
services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or rehabilitation of an injured person in the most populous county in the state for
the purpose of assigning a unit value and median charge to each type of
service and accommodation. In conducting the study, the department
shall consult with appropriate public and private medical and health
agencies. Upon completion of the study, the department shall prepare and
publish a relative value study which sets forth the unit value and median
charge assigned to each type of service and accommodation. The value of
any service or accommodation shall be determined by applying the unit
value and median charge assigned to the service or accommodation under

378

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

31-41-7

the relative value study. If a service or accommodation is not assigned a
unit value or median charge under the relative value study, the value of
the service or accommodation shall equal the reasonable cost of the same
or similar service or accommodation in the most populous county of this
state. Nothing herein shall preclude the department from adopting a schedule already established if it meets the requirement of this subsection. In
disputed cases, a court on its own motion or the motion of either party
may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than three licensed
physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the issue of the reasonable value of their medical expenses.
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in subsection (1) of this section
and in subsection (1) (e) of section 31-41-9 shall include expenses for any
nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with a
recognized religious method of healing.
(4) At appropriately reduced premium rates insurers may offer deductibles in amounts not exceeding $500 per accident in respect to the
insurance coverages required by this act applicable, however, only to
claims of the insured.
(5) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prohibit an
insurance policy from providing coverage for any nonmedical remedial
treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of
healing.
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 6.
CoUateral References.
Insurance<$^>ll.l.

44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64.
7 Am. Jur. 2d 298, Automobile Insura n c e § g#

31-41-7. Personal injuries covered—Primary coverage—Reduction of
benefits.—(1) The coverages described in section 31-41-6 shall be applicable t o :
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the insured when injured in an
accident in this state involving any motor vehicle.
(b) Personal injuries arising out of automobile accidents occurring
in this state sustained by any other natural person while occupying the
described motor vehicle with the consent of the insured or while a pedestrian if injured in an accident involving the described motor vehicle.
(2) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other
policy, including those complying with this act, primary coverage shall
be afforded by the policy insuring the motor vehicle out of the use of
which the accident arose.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under section 31-41-6
shall be reduced by:
(a) Any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive
as a result of an accident covered in this act under any workmen's compensation plan or any similar statutory plan; and
(b) Any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because of military enlistment, duty or service.
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31A-1-102, Purposes.
The purposes of the Insurance Code are to:
(1) ensure the solidity of insurers doing business in Utah;
(2) ensure that policyholders, claimants, and insurers are treated
fairly and equitably;
(3) ensure that Utah has an adequate and healthy insurance market, characterized by competitive conditions, the spirit of innovation,
and the exercise of initiative;
(4) provide for an insurance department that is expert in the field of
insurance and able to enforce the Insurance Code effectively;
(5) encourage cooperation between the Insurance Department and
other Utah regulatory bodies, as well as other federal and state governmental entities;
(6) preserve and improve state regulation of insurance;
(7) maintain freedom of contract and enterprise;
(8) encourage self regulation of the insurance industry;
(9) encourage loss prevention as part of the insurance industry;
(10) keep the public informed on insurance matters; and
(11) achieve other purposes stated elsewhere in the Insurance Code.
History: C. 1953, 31A-M02, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 6.
Insurance Code. — See § 31A-1-101.

31 A-l-103. Scope and applicability of title,
(1) This title does not apply to:
(a) retainer contracts made by attorneys-at-law with individual clients with fees based on estimates of the nature and amount of services
to be provided to the specific client, and similar contracts made with a
group of clients involved in the same or closely related legal matters;
(b) arrangements for providing benefits that do not exceed a limited
amount of consultations, advice on simple legal matters, either alone
or in combination with referral services, or the promise of fee discounts
for handling other legal matters;
(c) limited legal assistance on an informal basis involving neither an
express contractual obligation nor reasonable expectations, in the context of an employment, membership, educational, or similar relationship; or
(d) legal assistance by employee organizations to their members in
matters relating to employment.
(2) This title restricts otherwise legitimate business activity. What this
title does not prohibit is permitted unless contrary to other provisions of
Utah law.
4

CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
by insured while occupying "owned" vehicle
not insured by policy, 30 A.L.R.4th 172.
Validity, construction, and effect of statute

31A-22-307

establishing compensation for claims not
paid because of insurer's insolvency, 30
A.L.R.4th 1110.

31A-22-306. Personal injury protection.
Personal injury protection under Subsection 31A-22-302(2) provides the
coverages and benefits described under § 31A-22-307 to persons described
under § 31A-22-308, but is subject to the limitations, exclusions, and conditions set forth in § 31A-22-309.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-306, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; L. 1986, ch. 204,
§ 158.

ment, effective July 1, 1986, substituted
«31A-22-302(2)" for "31A-22-302(3)" and "in"
for "under."

Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendCOLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance
§ 1689.
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64.
A.L.R. — Combining or "stacking" of "no

fault" or personal injury protection (PIP) coverages in automobile liability policy or policies, 29 A.L.R.4th 12.
Key Numbers. — Insurance «=> 11.1.

31A-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages and
benefits.
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include:
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, rehabilitation (which includes prosthetic devices),
ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a total of
$3,000 per person;
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income
and loss of earning capacity per person from inability to work, for a
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss, except that this
benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless
the disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks
after the date of injury; and
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a
maximum of 365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the injured person would have performed for his household, except that
this benefit need not be paid for the first three days after the date
of injury unless the person's inability to perform these services
continues for more than two consecutive weeks;
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of
$1,500 per person; and
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(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his
heirs, in the total of $3,000.
(2) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided
for in Subsection (1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commissioner shall, at least once each odd-numbered year, conduct a relative value
study of services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or
rehabilitation of an injured person in the most populous county in the state
to assign a unit value and median charge to each type of service and accommodation. In conducting the study, the department shall consult with appropriate public and private medical and health agencies. Upon completion
of the study, the department shall prepare and publish a relative value
study which sets forth the unit value and median charge assigned to each
type of service and accommodation. The value of any service or accommodation is determined by applying the unit value and median charge assigned
to the service or accommodation under the relative value study. If a service
or accommodation is not assigned a unit value or median charge under the
relative value study, the value of the service or accommodation shall equal
the reasonable cost of the same or similar service or accommodation in the
most populous county of this state. This subsection does not preclude the
department from adopting a schedule already established or a schedule
prepared by persons outside the department, if it meets the requirements of
this subsection. In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the
motion of either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not
more than three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and testify on
the issue of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical expenses.
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection (l)(a) and in Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care
and treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method
of healing.
(4) At appropriately reduced premium rates, insurers may offer deductibles in amounts not exceeding $500 per accident with respect to the insurance coverages required under this section. However, the deductible is applicable only to claims of the named insured and persons living in his
household.
(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance
providing coverages greater than the minimum coverage required under
this chapter nor does it require the segregation of those minimum coverages from other coverages in the same policy.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by
i t 1985, ch. 242, § 27; L. 1986, ch. 204,
§ 159.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1986, inserted "prosthetic devices" in Subsection (l)(a), and made
minor stylistic changes throughout the section.
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78-2-1. Number of justices — Term — Chief justice and
associate chief justice — Selection and functions,
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices.
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed initially to serve until
the first general election held more than three years after the effective date of
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme
Court is ten years and commences on the first Monday in January, next
following the date of election. A justice whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed and qualified.
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief justice from among
the members of the court by a majority vote of all justices. The term of the
office of chief justice is four years. The chief justice may not serve successive
terms. The chief justice may resign from the office of chief justice without
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be removed from the
office of chief justice by a majority vote of all justices of the Supreme Court.
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 days of a
vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall act as chief justice until
a chief justice is elected under this section. If the associate chief justice is
unable or unwilling to act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as
chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this section.
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of the Supreme
Court, the chief justice has additional duties as provided by law.
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The term of office of
the associate chief justice is two years. The associate chief justice may serve in
that office no more than two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall
be elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent
or otherwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief
justice. The chief justice, where not inconsistent with law, may delegate responsibilities to the associate chief justice.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1969, ch. 247, § 1; 1986, ch.
47, § 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(2), rewrote the second sentence which read

"Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the
Supreme Court is ten years and until his successor is appointed and approved in accordance
with Section 20-1-7.1" and, in Subsection (6),
substituted "determines" for "decides" at the
end of the fourth sentence.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
5
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(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b,
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988,
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,1988, substituted "formal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in
Subsection (3)(e); added Subsection (3)(f); redesignated former Subsections (3)(f) to (3)(i) accordingly; substituted "(i)" for "(h)" at the end

of Subsection (4)(g); and made minor stylistic
changes.
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989, added "and Forestry" at the end of Subsection (3)(e)(iii); rewrote Subsection (4)(a)
which read "first degree and capital felony convictions"; substituted "(f)" for "(i)" at the end of
Subsection (4)(g); and made minor stylistic
changes.
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction,
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April
25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a)
and (b) in Subsection (1); inserted "resulting
from formal adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a); substituted "state agencies" for
"state and local agencies" in Subsection (2)(a);
substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings
of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a);
deleted "notwithstanding any other provision
of law" at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted
Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsections (2Kb) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to
(2)(i); added "except those from the small
claims department of a circuit court" at the end

of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic
changes.
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 210, effective April 25,1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection
(2)(h) as Subsection (2)(i).
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 248, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(2)(a), rewrote the phrase before "except"
which had read "the final orders and decrees of
state and local agencies or appeals from the
district court review of them"; deleted "notwithstanding any other provision of law" at the
end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted present Subsection (2)(b); designated former Subsections
(2Kb) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and
substituted "first degree or capital felony" for
"first or capital degree felony" in present Subsection (2)(f).
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